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ABSTRACT:
In this chapter we consider economic systems, and in particular financial systems, from the perspec-
tive of the physics of complex systems (i.e. statistical physics, the theory of critical phenomena, and
their cognates). This field of research is known as econophysics—alternative names are ‘financial
physics’ and ‘statistical phynance.’ This title was coined in 1995 by Eugene Stanley, and since then
its researchers have attempted to forge it as an independent and important field, one that stands in
opposition to standard (‘Neo-Classical’) economic theory. Econophysicists argue that the empirical
data is best explained in terms flowing out of statistical physics, according to which the (stylized)
facts of economics are best understood as emergent properties of a complex system. However, some
economists argue that the methods used by econophysics are not sufficient to prove the existence of
underlying complexity in economic systems. The complexity claim can nonetheless be defended as a
good example of an inference to the best explanation rather than a definitive deduction.
To appear in J. Collier and C. Hooker (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol.10: Philoso-
phy of Complex Systems. North Holland: Elsevier.
1
INTRODUCTION
Within the ‘complexity science’ camp there are two broadly distinct ways of mod-
eling the properties and behavior of socioeconomic systems1:
• ‘Econobiology’ (‘evolutionary economics’) perspective: uses the lessons of
evolutionary biology to explain economic phenomena—economic complex-
ity is viewed as analogous to, or grounded in, biological complexity.
• ‘Econophysics’ perspective: applies to economic phenomena various mod-
els and concepts associated with the physics of complex systems—e.g. sta-
tistical mechanics, condensed matter theory, self-organized criticality, mi-
crosimulation, etc.
Both of these approaches are ‘population-level’ ones (cf. [Mayr, 1970; Sober,
1980]): they seek to account for ‘global’ or ‘collective’ phenomena. They both do
so in a ‘bottom-up’, ‘generative’ manner: collective (‘macroscopic’) properties are
viewed as the result of interactions at the level of the (‘microscopic’) constituents.
However, the aggregate and its elements are deemed to be of different kinds with
1Some seem to think that the subsumption of complex socioeconomic behaviour under ‘Self-
Organized Criticality’ counts a distinct third way. However, self-organized criticality can be easily
accommodated within both of the economic complexity frameworks I mention and, hence, should not
really be considered a separate enterprise. It is, strictly speaking, a part of (non-equilibrium) statistical
physics.
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causal lives of their own, the former (minimally) being supervenient on the lat-
ter. In interesting cases (i.e. where there is complexity) the aggregate system’s
properties (and dynamics, laws, etc.) are said to be ‘emergent’ in the sense that
they are not reducible to some particular configuration of the constituents (and
their properties) despite the fact that some such configurations will be sufficient
for the generation of said properties—hence, the particular configuration will be
sufficient but not necessary for the production of the emergent property. In other
words, the properties of the complex system are ‘multiply-realizable’ by distinct
configurations (physicists refer to this latter property as ‘universality’).2
Here I restrict my attention solely to the physics-based approach3 (i.e. econo-
physics), an approach generally couched in the language of statistical physics.4
Statistical physics is a framework that allows systems consisting of many (possi-
bly heterogeneous) particles to be rigorously analyzed. In econophysics these tech-
niques are applied to ‘economic particles’, namely investors, traders, consumers,
and so on. Markets are then viewed as (macroscopic) complex systems with an
internal (microscopic) structure consisting of many of these ‘particles’ interacting
so as to generate the systemic properties (the microstructural components being
‘reactive’ in this case, as mentioned already, thus resulting in an adaptive complex
system).
I further restrict my attention to financial markets since that is where most work
in econophysics has been conducted, on account of the availability of copious
2The concepts of ‘supervenience,’ ‘multiple-realization,’ and, more so, ‘emergence’ are still very
slippery and I shall avoid them for the most part in this chapter (with the exception of §2). How-
ever, economic systems do raise interesting and potentially novel issues vis-a´-vis these concepts: for
example, the ‘subvenience basis’ of elements responsible for the (supervenient) economic properties
and behaviour—that is, the economic agents and their properties—have strategy and foresight, and
therefore respond to the unitary properties and behaviour they create together. This highlights quite
starkly one of the reasons why a simple (‘macro-to-micro’ or ‘micro-to-macro’) causal story cannot be
told about events involving economic systems and economic agents (and complex systems and their
parts more generally): the two form a co-evolving pair, updating their behaviour in the light of changes
in the others’ properties. In this way the ‘micro-macro’ disconnect of traditional economic theory is
overcome.
3The econophysics approach cannot be the whole story in and of itself; it cannot (and should not)
be considered as completely distinct from other approaches. The underlying behaviour that generates
the economic data that econophysicists deal with is, after all, generated by socio-biological systems
(of a rather special sort, as mentioned in the previous footnote). No doubt there will, at some level,
have to be a union of the two perspectives (‘physical’ and ‘sociobiological’)—some early progress in
this regard has been made in behavioural finance, including ‘herding models’ [Cont and Bouchaud,
2000] and ‘minority game’ models [Challet et al., 2005]. My thanks to Clifford Hooker for raising my
awareness of the difficult ‘integrative’ issue (private communication).
4There are other physics-inspired approaches to economics that do not utilize this analogy to sta-
tistical physics, using an analogy to some other branch of physics—interesting examples are gauge
theory [Ilinski, 2001] and quantum field theory [Baaquie, 2004]. However, these approaches, though
often referred to as examples of econophysics, do not match what most econophysicists have in mind
(nor what I have in mind); namely, an approach that seeks to build physically realistic models and
theories of economic phenomena from the actual empirically observed features of economic systems.
Statistical physics is a many-body theory as, in general, is economics. One doesn’t get the same in-
tuitive connection with models based on quantum field theory and gauge theory—though, it has to be
said, they do surprisingly well at reproducing economic data.
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amounts of high-frequency data. Indeed, at the root of most of the work carried out
in in econophysics is a family of ‘stylized facts’ (empirically observable universal
generalizations) that are to be found in this economic data—see §6. Econophysi-
cists seek to find new instances of such facts and to explain these and previously
known stylized facts using physics-inspired techniques and models, with the ulti-
mate aim of providing them with a theoretical basis. In fact, economists (primar-
ily econometrists and those working in empirical finance) have been well aware
of most of the phenomena that econophysicists have ‘discovered’ for quite some
time. This has led to some impatience with econophysicists amongst economists—
see, for example, [Gallegati et al., 2006; Lux and Ausloos, 2002]. However, the
econophysicists differ from the economists in that they aim to explain the vari-
ous phenomena catalogued in the stylized facts by providing physically realistic
(‘microscopic’) models and underlying theories. Also, the econophysicists tend
to view the stylized facts more robustly, as genuine laws (on a par with those of
fundamental physics) rather than lesser cousins as economists seem to. Hence, a
claim often made by econophysicists is that their models are more ‘realistic’ than
those offered up by economists and econometricians (see, for example, [Stanley et
al., 2006] p. 330). This realism is supposed to be a consequence of the physics-
based methodology which is more empirical: ‘data first, then model’—I consider
this claim in §5.2.
My aim in this chapter is simply to present the central ideas of econophysics: to
show where they come from (their motivations), and to show how it all fits in with
complex systems science. Since the notion of complexity is, to a large extent, still
‘up in the air’, I shall begin in §2 by getting straight on what I mean by this term
within the confines of this chapter and as applied to (financial) economics. In §3 I
introduce some elementary facts from statistics that will be used in subsequent sec-
tions. The main features of the NeoClassical economics and finance are presented
in §4. I then present some of the background to econophysics, and introduce the
basic idea behind it in §5. This is followed in §6 by a look at the the statistical
puzzles in economic data (known as the stylized facts). Econophysics is a reaction
to the standard model and a response to the problems faced by the standard model:
we see how this is so in §7. I then consider some more overtly conceptual issues:
in §8 I consider the issue of laws and invariance in econophysics and, finally, in §9
I present, and rebut, some recent objections to the econophysicists’ inferences to
complexity underlying the stylized facts.
2
COMPLEXITY AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS
‘Complexity’ is a notoriously slippery concept. Usually, precise definitions—in
the sense of necessary and sufficient conditions—are avoided. However, whatever
complexity may be, complex systems are supposed to possess it, so we can reframe
the discussion so as to refer to these rather than complexity per se. Herbert Simon
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gives a rough characterization of a complex system as follows:
by a complex system I mean one made up of a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way.
In such systems, the whole is more than the sum of its parts, not in an ultimate, metaphysical sense, but
in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction,
it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the whole ([Simon, 1981] p.4).
Economic systems are an obvious candidate for the ‘complexity treatment’: they
contain multiple agents, of different types (producers and consumers; risk averse
and risk takers; firms and individuals, etc.), all competing for finite resources of
some kind or another, and interacting in such a way as to generate the properties
and dynamics of economic systems and subsystems. Econophysicists (and a small
but growing number of economists) agree that these properties and the dynamics
fit the ‘complex system’ bill: one finds, for example, scaling and universality,
criticality, fractal patterns, and (candidates for) emergent properties. All attributes
that a good complex system should possess.
2.1 Characteristics of Complex Systems
It is unfortunate that a more precise definition of a ‘complex system’ is still not
agreed upon: there are almost as many definitions as there are discussions—
indeed, the difficulty of the problem of definition points, I think, to the fact that
we should avoid ‘unificatory’ approaches to complexity. However, it is reasonably
safe to assume a kernel that these diverse accounts share. This kernel involves a
triplet of characteristics (I hesitate to call them necessary conditions):
• A (unit) complex system must contain many subunits (the exact number
being left vague).
• These subunits must be interdependent (at least some of the time).
• The interactions between the subunits must be nonlinear (at least some of
the time).
The properties of the (unit) complex system are understood to be generated by
or supervenient on the properties and interactions of the subunits that constitute
it: there is no difference in the unit system without a difference in the subunits
(though it is possible that a difference in the subunits does not manifest itself at the
unit level). These properties are said to be ‘emergent’ when they amount to new
complex (‘systemic’) structure that, as Kim puts it, “in some sense transcend[s]
the simpler properties of [its] constituent parts” ([2003] p. 556). The subunits
need not be identical, and the introduction of heterogeneity can also result in the
emergence of higher-order properties of the unit system.5
If we are talking about an adaptive complex system then we should add the
following condition:
5The canonical example is Thomas Schelling’s study of segregation ([1971]; [1978] p. 147-155).
Here, slight differences in the (microscopic) preferences of individuals lead to massive, unexpected
(i.e. emergent) macroscopic differences: very slight individual preferences to have neighbours ‘like
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• The individual subunits modify their properties and behaviour with respect
to a changing environment resulting in the generation of new systemic prop-
erties that ‘reflect’ the change that the environment has undergone.
If we are talking about a self-organizing adaptive complex system then we should
also add:
• The individual subunits modify their own properties and behaviour with re-
spect to the properties and behaviour of the unit system they jointly determine—
in other words, there is ‘downward causation’ operating from the systemic
properties to the subunits’ properties.6
These characteristics certainly seem to be in tune with most contemporary discus-
sions of complex systems.
However, as Latora and Marchiori ([2004] p. 377) point out, these characteris-
tics (and, indeed, most such characterizations) miss out on what they take to be an
essential aspect of complex systems: the network structure of the subunits. Much
recent work, especially on the modeling of complex systems and the reproduction
of ‘real-world’ economic phenomena such as price dynamics, has focused on the
structural features of such networks, rather than on the specific form of the non-
linear interactions between individual subunits—see [Amaral and Ottino, 2004]
for further details on the relevance of networks to complex systems science. It is
highly likely that future econophysics research will include complex networks as a
major component, and this may function as the ontological glue that sticks together
econophysics’ models and the underlying sociobiological mechanisms responsible
for the economic reality these models are intended to represent.
2.2 Extreme Events as an Indication of Complexity
There are additional features of complex systems that are involved in economics—
in large part these can be derived from the aforementioned features. For example,
themselves’ (i.e. in terms of colour, wealth, or in fact any property one cares to choose) can, despite a
preference for integration, lead an initially well-integrated population into total segregation with respect
to the chosen property. In other words, heterogeneity (with respect to the chosen property) coupled to
a preference to be near others like oneself in that property (however weak that preference might be)
provides a (self-organizing) clustering mechanism serving to partition the population.
6There are problems with the notion of downward causation, notably that any causal chain from
an emergent property E to some property P of the subunits (which subunits, you will recall, form the
‘base’ B ‘generating’ E) is underdetermined by the base itself. I.e. whenever there is E there is B (or
something resembling B in terms of its causal powers and its ability to generate E—E being multiply
realizable), so whenever we say that E ‘downwardly causes’ P we might just as well say B causes
P and dispense with the notion of downward causation altogether. This is a general problem with
‘population thinking’ according to which aggregate-level phenomena have a causal life of their own.
However, I agree with O’Connor and Wong [2005] that this problem evaporates once we realize that
emergence is not a synchronic relationship between the subunits and the unit but a dynamical process
(and, hence, a diachronic relationship). This is indeed borne out by many branches of complexity
science where we see that it is local iterations of processes that lead to emergent (global) phenomena.
For a similar argument see [Hooker, 2004].
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complex systems often exhibit large and surprising changes that appear not to have
an outside cause, instead arising endogenously—in other words, on a post hoc ex-
amination there is no sign that the arrival of news has caused the crash nor is there
any link up to the dynamics of the financial fundamentals. The corresponding
economic phenomenon here is, of course, the stock market crash (see [Sornette,
2003])—speculative bubbles then correspond to a self-organization process (see
[Lux, 1996]). Econophysicists argue that stock market crashes, and other eco-
nomic phenomena (that are often puzzling from the perspective of standard eco-
nomic theory, ‘outliers’ in fact) are an entirely natural consequence of the view
that economic systems, such as financial markets, are complex. Extreme events,
involving collective phenomena (resulting from the iteration of nonlinear interac-
tions), such as herding or alignment (as seems to occur in bubbles and crashes),
are an integral part of scaling theory (itself a part of statistical physics). They cor-
respond to critical phenomena in which there is long-range dependence between
the elements (i.e. diverging correlation length) so that small changes in certain pa-
rameter values can result in massive systemic changes. More generally, criticality
involves fluctuations of the ‘order parameter’ (say the returns7 on some asset) and
power law behaviour. Hence, extreme behaviour in a system is a strong indication
that complexity is involved. Before we turn to these puzzles and issues, let us first
briefly present some basic facts from probability theory and financial economics.
3
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS
Probability distributions are of vital importance in complex systems research, es-
pecially in the investigation of the properties of financial markets. They are what
allow us to ascertain the inner workings of complex systems, to uncover their reg-
ularities and aspects of their structure.
Given an experiment (or process) with outcome sample space S, a random vari-
able X is a map from outcomes to real numbers—we assume that the map is ex-
haustive in that every point of S is assigned some (not necessarily distinct) value.
Given such a random variable X , a probability density function P(x) provides
information concerning the way the variable is distributed. To work out the prob-
ability that the value of X is in between the values a and b one simply computes
the integral
∫ a
b
P(x)dx. Of course, the most well-known example of such a distri-
bution is the Gaussian (‘normal’) case, with distribution function:
(1) PGauss(x) = 1√
2piσ2
· exp
[
− (x− x)
2
2σ2
]
7Returns are defined as follows: Let p(t) be the price of some financial asset at time t. The return
Rτ (t) from the asset, at time t for scale factor τ (giving the frequency of returns), is the relative
variation of it’s price from t to t+ τ , or: Rτ (t) =
p(t+τ)−p(t)
p(t)
. According to the standard model of
finance these returns are uncorrelated IID (independent and identically-distributed random) variables;
a feature flatly contradicted by the empirical data from real markets.
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Here, x is the mean (= Σni=1xi/nq) and σ
2 is the variance. This distribution is
ubiquitous in the natural (and social) world because it is linked to the central limit
theorem which tells us, roughly, that any stochastic process (understood as the
aggregated result of a complex mixture of (independent) random factors) will be
characterized by a Gaussian distribution.
A more appropriate distribution for finance is the lognormal distribution which
simply involves the (natural) logarithm of x being normally distributed:
(2) PLogNorm(x) = 1√
2pi
· exp
[
− (logx− x)
2/(2σ2)
xσ
]
Of course, ln(x) for x < 0 is undefined, which matches the non-negativity of
most assets. However, variables that are normally distributed tend to exhibit rather
mild fluctuations. They are clearly not capable of dealing with the kinds of large-
scale extreme fluctuations that correspond to stock market crashes for example—
fine for human weight, not for human wealth.8 Despite this the (log-) normal
distribution is a central component of the standard model of finance, as we see in
the next section—recall that the central limit theorem plays a role here too, only
with a multiplication of factors replacing the additivity of factors in the normal
distribution.
Hence, much of the action in econophysics research tends to focus on probabil-
ity distributions for variables representing financial observables where it is argued,
on the basis of empirical evidence, that certain financial and economic observables
do not fit a Gaussian curve, but fit instead some other distribution. The evidence
depicts a system with observables that frequently take on ‘extreme’ values, values
that would be counted as incredibly rare (impossible for all practical purposes)
according to a Gaussian distributed variable.9
Examples of alternatives to the normal distribution are the exponential, stretched
exponential, and the Le´vy distributions (with ‘fat’ power law tails)—there are very
many more. The latter class of distribution is of the most importance since it is
believed to point to the underlying complexity of the generating process (they are
viewed as ‘signatures’ of complexity). For cases in which x is large (in which
case the Le´vy distribution possesses ‘Pareto tails’), the power law tail distribution
function is:
(3) PPower(x) ∝
αAα±
‖x‖1+α , ‖x‖ → ∞
8I’ve heard of extraordinary cases of people weighing around seven times my own body weight,
and that is truly exceptional: it must mark some natural boundary on possible weight sustainable by the
human form. However, there are very many people who earn many orders of magnitude more money
than I do: Bill Gates (as of 2007) earns around 750000 times more money per year than me!
9The lognormal distribution fares slightly better than the normal distribution by having more proba-
bility mass in the tails. However, as I mentioned above, it still radically underestimates the probabilities
of extreme events.
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Here the (constant) exponent α is the ‘tail amplitude’ (or ‘tail index’) which pro-
vides information about the tail (it sets the slope of the graph, for example10)—
α = 2 corresponds to a Gaussian; as α approaches zero the center becomes more
peaked and the tails fatter. The constant A± determines the size of the fluctuations
of the relevant observable, x.
Power law distributions are characterized by the slow decay of probability mass
in the tails of the distribution—it is for this reason that they are known as ‘fat tailed
distributions’. We see that the thickness of the tails is one of the stylized facts that
the standard model of finance has trouble explaining, since that model is based
on a Gaussian (or log-normal) distribution which decays much more rapidly in
the tails. I should point out that the log-normal distribution provides a very good
fit of the data from a great many situations in economics and finance—indeed,
it is often difficult to distinguish log-normal from power law distributions. The
problems arise when one considers the extremes of the distribution (e.g. for big
earners or for very large fluctuations in stocks prices—bubbles and crashes, that
is). Note also that the size of the slope (determined by the power law exponent)
varies according to the financial instrument involved: commodities and stocks, for
example, appear to demand significantly different values (thus altering the kind of
distribution). It is possible, then, that there are different mechanisms generating
the behaviour of financial observables for a range of financial systems.
Notably, from the point of view of complexity research, these power law distri-
butions are scale invariant (like fractals only in function-space): events (or phe-
nomena) of all magnitudes can occur, with no characteristic scale. What this means
is that the (relative) probability of observing an event of magnitude ‖x‖ = 1000
and observing one of ‖x′‖ = 100 does not depend on the standard of measurement
(i.e. on the reference units). The ratio between these probabilities will be the same
as that for ‖x‖ = 1000 and ‖x′′‖ = 10000. Hence, there is no fundamental differ-
ence between extreme events and events of small magnitude: they are described
by the same law (that is, the distribution scales).
Scale invariance of this sort is a feature of the so-called critical phenomena
(at phase transitions) studied in statistical physics where one has the simultaneous
involvement of many (widely) different length scales.11 Given that this problem
10When we plot the distribution of a power law, Prob(x) ∼ xα, on a log(Prob(x) ) versus log(‖x‖)
plot (where ‖x‖ is the size of some event or magnitude of some phenomenon (a stock price fluctuation,
say) and Prob(x) is its occurrence probability) we find a straight line of slope α, suggesting (if not
quite implying) that the distribution is scale-invariant (the ratio of ‖x‖ to its occurrence probability—
that is, the number of fluctuations of a given magnitude—is invariant under rescaling). That a power
law distribution would show up linear on log-log paper follows from the fact that given a power law
f(x) = xα, logf(x) = α logx. Note that one often sees the cumulative distribution according to
which one considers not the probability of an ‖x‖-event, but of events greater than or equal to ‖x‖.
11Specifically: near a critical point, fluctuations of the (macroscopic) order parameter will appear
at all possible scales. In the case of the liquid-gas phase transition one will have liquid drops and gas
bubbles ranging from the molecular level to the volume of the entire system. At the critical point these
fluctuations become infinite. The analogous situation in the financial context would be, for example,
fluctuations in asset returns at all possible scales. An excellent introduction to the theory of critical
phenomena is [Binney et al., 1992].
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(of physics at many scales) has been solved, one might expect that the methods
used therein can be usefully transferred to the economic case. This explains the
interest of statistical physicists, and the raison d’eˆtre of econophysics.
4
NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS
NeoClassical Economics depicts markets as efficient machines, automatically seek-
ing out the configuration that is best for all economic agents. This configuration
is an equilibrium state, the one that maximizes utility. The theoretical framework
involves several extreme idealizations, not least of which are the assumptions of
perfect rationality and omniscience (including unlimited foresight) on the part of
the economic agents! Indeed, having rationality is the same thing as maximizing
expected utility. Specific economic theories are constructed from this framework
by applying the basic postulates to various economic situations. Financial eco-
nomics is no exception. Neoclasscal finance is based on a random walk model
which states that sequences of measurements made to determine the value of some
financial observable (returns for example) are such that the present (discounted)
value is the best estimate (prediction) one can give for future values.
4.1 The Standard Model of Finance
Johannes Voit [2005] calls “the standard model of finance” the view that stock
prices exhibit geometric Brownian motion—i.e. the logarithm of a stock’s price
performs a random walk.12 Assuming the random walk property, we can roughly
set up the standard model using three simple ideas: (1) the best estimation of an as-
set’s future price is its current price13, (2) the distribution of price changes forms a
bell-curve (‘mesokurtic’ or Gaussian condition), and (3) buys balance sales. In the
context of finance, these principles of the standard model are encoded in the cen-
tral tool for pricing options14: the ‘Black-Scholes-Merton model’ [BSM] [Black
and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973]. This is often viewed as a piece of early econo-
physics, though not along the lines of todays econophysics which is concerned
12This central idea of the standard model, though with an arithmetic Brownian motion, can be traced
back to the doctoral thesis of Louis Bachelier, a student of Poincare´—this thesis, from 1900, is in
print again in an English translation: [Davis and Etheridge, 2006]. This model was, more or less, later
rediscovered (independently) by the physicist M. F. M. Osbourne [1959]. For those with no knowledge
whatsoever of mathematical finance who wish to learn more, I recommend Ross [2002].
13This is known as the Martingale condition defined by the conditional probability E[Xn+1 |
x1, ..., xn] = xn (where E is the average or expected value of what is enclosed in square brack-
ets and Xi is a random variable conditioned on outcomes xj ).
14In brief, options are contracts that give the owner the right but not the obligation to buy (= ‘call
option’) or sell (= ‘put option’) some asset (= ‘the underlying’) for a pre-specified price (= the ‘strike
price’) at some pre-specified time in the future. Hence, the ‘payoff’ of an option is a function of the
future price of the asset (or a group of such)—for this reason they are part of the family of financial
instruments known as ‘derivatives’.
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with ‘out of equilibrium’ aspects. Moreover, the model is derived from the postu-
lates of the neoclassical theory, rather than the data (independently of an a priori
theory of how markets ought to behave).
The central idea that underpins BSM is that one views markets as many-body
dynamical systems. This insight is then used to draw an analogy with concepts
from thermodynamics. In particular, the BSM equation brings over the concept of
thermodynamic equilibrium into finance. This is defined in the financial context
as a steady state reached when the underlying stock and the stock option are bal-
anced in terms of the payoff they yield compared to the risk they entail. The BSM
equation describes this relationship15:
(4)
∂V
∂t
+
1
2
σ2S2
∂V
∂S2
+ rS
∂V
∂S
− rV = 0
The solution, C(S, t), of this equation then gives us the cost of constructing an
option from the specified stock (or the ‘rational value’ of the option). Assuming
constant r and σ, this is:
(5) C(S, t) = SN(d1)− Le−r(T−t)N(d2)
Here, L is the option’s ‘strike price’ and T is its time to maturity. N( ) is the cu-
mulative probability distribution function for a (standard) normal random variable.
The arguments of the function are:
d1 =
log(S/L) + (r + 12σ
2)(T − t)
σ
√
(T − t) (6)
d2 =
log(S/L) + (r − 12σ2)(T − t)
σ
√
(T − t) = d1 − σ
√
(T − t) (7)
The problem of finding the best price for options is reformulated as a diffusion
equation from which one gets the prices of various option-types by imposing vari-
ous appropriate boundary conditions on the possible solutions.
In terms of the probability distributions from the previous section, then, the rel-
evant function is clearly the log-normal: this is required as a postulate.16 Hence,
modern finance is very much a NeoClassical theory. However, as mentioned, nor-
mal distributions cover only fairly mild fluctuations around some central value.
Used as a model for ascertaining the riskiness of certain options, the BSM equa-
tion will assign vanishingly small probabilities to extreme fluctuations that are, in
reality, not all that rare.
15The various terms in this partial differential equation are interpreted as follows: V is the value
of some specified option (the details change depending on the type of option involved: in this case we
consider European call options), σ is the stock’s implied volatility (standard deviation of stock returns),
S is the current price of the underlying stock, and r is the (risk-free) interest rate.
16Further postulates required by the model are: the efficient market hypothesis (see below), constant
interest rate, zero commission charges, and no dividend payouts.
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4.2 Market Efficiency
This formal framework of BSM is given conceptual foundation via the efficient
market hypothesis which states that prices always reflect all available information
in actual markets [Fama, 1970]—the prices themselves emerge (aggregatively)
through the consensus amongst a group of perfectly rational agents (the prices
themselves are therefore rational). Price changes occur as a result of the exogenous
intervention on the market by a piece of news, itself an unpredictable event. It
follows that price changes are themselves unpredictable. Or, as Joseph McCauley
expresses it: “there are no patterns/correlations in the market that can be exploited
for profit” ([2004] p. 88). Let us spell this out in more detail.
The EMH is an inference from (NeoClassical) rational expectations principles:
traders will wish to maximize their utility. This implies that they will look to ex-
ploit the market. The way to do this would be to spot patterns in price movements
and then buy when they expect the price to give higher (than average) returns and
sell when they expect lower (than average) returns. The trouble is, in doing this
they will change the very patterns they are attempting to exploit: buying increases
the price and selling drives the price down. This equalizes the market so that all
financial instruments give the same return (modulo risk). In other words, the in-
formation that this arbitageur trader had about the market (the patterns) becomes
reflected in the market prices. An endgenous process balances the market out. So,
while there can be patterns that can be exploited, this is short lived (for the spe-
cific pattern), since acting on the information affects the prices and patterns get
erased (by a process analogous to Walras’ taˆtonnement). This means that the best
estimate for the future is the present price because that price reflects all known in-
formation (modulo short term discrepancies). One is left with the problem of what
causes the price changes: the answer has to be external factors, and given the vast
number and unpredictability of these, they are best modeled as random processes.
Therefore, prices changes follow a random walk, and this gives us the foundation
of modern (academic) finance and financial risk evaluation.
From the efficient market hypothesis we can quite clearly derive a testable pre-
diction about the behaviour of financial observables (such as prices, returns, etc.):
they should follow random walks in time—experience leads one to suggest a bi-
ased random walk to account for the steady growth over long time scales. How-
ever, as we see in the next section, returns don’t appear to behave in this way in
real markets (cf. [LeBaron, 2006] p. 222-4).
5
THE ROUGH GUIDE TO ECONOPHYSICS
The term ‘econophysics’ was chosen with some care to follow the path of such
mergers as ‘astrophysics’, ‘biophysics’, and ‘geophysics’. The reason for this was
to keep the kind of work carried out by econophysicists within physics departments
([Stanley et al., 2006] p. 337—note that it was H. E. Stanley who thus christened
12 D. RICKLES
the field (in print) in [Stanley et al., 1996a]. Minimally, econophysics is based on
the observation of similarities between economic systems and concepts and those
from physics. For example, Bertrand Roehner defines it simply as “the investiga-
tion of economic problems by physicists” ([2005] p. 3). A slightly less general
definition comes from Mantegna and Stanley ([2000]: “The word econophysics
describes the present attempts of a number of physicists to model financial and
economic systems using paradigms and tools borrowed from theoretical and statis-
tical physics” (p. 355). However, as they go on to say, a “characteristic difference
[from traditional approaches to economics and mathematical finance—DR] is the
emphasis that physicists put on the empirical analysis of economic data” (ibid.).
This latter factor is supposed to constitute the ‘added value’ of econophysics.
5.1 Some Econophysics Pre-History
The existence of a close relationship between physics and economics is noth-
ing new, of course: many of the great economists did their original training in
physics, and the influence of physics is clearly evident in many of economic
theory’s models—see [Mirowski, 1989; Ingrao and Israel, 1990; Cohen, 1994;
Schabas, 2006]. I already mentioned too how the centerpiece of modern finance,
the Black-Scholes-Merton model, is directly derived from physics. There are,
moreover, many instances of physicists who have applied ‘the physicist’s method’
to social phenomena. For example, Daniel Bernoulli found that there were statis-
tical regularities in what are prima facie unpredictable events—e.g. the number of
letters in the paris dead-letter office (see [Farmer et al. , 2005] p. 37). The enig-
matic theoretical physicist Ettore Majorana outlined and defended the application
of statistical physics to social phenomena [Mantegna, 2005]. One cannot forget,
either, Mandelbrot’s discovery of scaling behaviour of cotton prices: [Mandelbrot,
1963]. The ‘statistical physics connection’ also underpins much of this earlier
work: the idea is that one can ignore microscopic detail (the individual social
entities) in favour of the coarse-grained macro-description (the groups of individ-
uals bound together by social forces), with the aim of deriving macro-level laws.
Econophysics is, at bottom, this same thought played out again, only now with the
benefit of a rigorously solved theory of multi-scale systems (i.e. renormalization
group theory) giving principled reasons to ignore microscopic details in favour of
a few choice parameters.
5.2 The Methodology of Econophysics
Econophysics gets itself off the ground as a separate enterprise from economics be-
cause, unlike the former, the latter supposedly has an unscientific ‘non-empirical’
(or ‘axiomatic’) methodology.17 As Zhang [1998] puts it, “as a physicist, one may
17This brings us to a more general point concerning what Thomas Gieryn calls “Boundary Work”
(see, for example, [Gieryn, 1999]). Gieryn argues that when a new discipline comes along, it must
strive to separate itself off from other ongoing endeavours and, in particular, aim to demonstrate that it,
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get the strange feeling that the theory [the standard model of economics—DR] is
detached from the experiment” (p. 51). Likewise, Challett et al. write that
physicists generally feel uneasy about several pillars of mainstream economic theory, such as rational
expectations, the efficient market hypothesis and the notion of equilibria to name a few. This approach
looks too axiomatic and formal to deal with complex systems as, for example, financial markets. ...
[E]conophysicists deny the very rules of the game on which mainstream academic research in eco-
nomics is based. ([Challet et al., 2005] p. 14)
As this quotation makes plain, econophysics is viewed (by most of its practition-
ers) as a revolutionary reaction to standard economic theory that threatens to en-
force a paradigm shift in thinking about economic systems and phenomena.
We have here something akin to the ‘principle-theory’ versus ‘constructive the-
ory’ distinction that Einstein made in regard to his 1905 formulation of special
relativity ([Einstein, 2002])—the distinction was based on thermodynamics (on
the ‘principle’ side) and statistical mechanics (on the ‘constructive’ side). The ap-
proach of Black, Scholes, and Merton involved a principle-theory-type approach
in that the various principles going into their model were given the status of pos-
tulates, and no underlying mechanisms for the phenomena were elucidated (a`
la thermodynamics). By contrast, econophysicists, making use of the statistical
physics (rather than thermodynamical) analogy, adopt a constructive-theory-type
approach: their models are derived from the data and are physically well-founded
by providing basic mechanisms for the phenomena. As Johnson et al. [2003] state:
“[a]s physicists, our tendency is to put our trust in models which are microscopi-
cally realistic, and where the model parameters hold some physical meaning” (p.
251).
Stanley et al. [1999] claim that econophysics thus approaches economic sys-
tems “in the spirit of experimental physics” (p. 157): in contrast to standard
methods in economics, econophysicists “begin empirically, with real data that one
can analyze in some detail, but without prior models” (ibid.). While almost any
philosopher of science would disagree with the details of this statement, the point
is well-taken: data first, then model (whether the ‘raw data’ is itself encoded in a
data model or not we can ignore here). As Bouchaud and Potters [2003] put it: “no
theoretical model can ever supersede empirical data [in physics]” ... [p]hysicists
insist on a detailed comparison between ‘theory’ and ‘experiments’ (i.e. empir-
ical results, whenever available)” (p. xvi). However, it is absurd to think that
economists would disagree with this in principle: there is an entire field (empir-
ical finance) that adopts this same methodology (often employing ‘model free’
nonparametric statistics to analyze financial data).
It seems that the specific target for econophysicists’ animosity is some form of
the (rationalist) ‘Austrian-type’ economic theory, with its rejection of an empirical
unlike its competitors, is truly scientific. It seems that econophysicists are doing just this in opposing
the axiomatic style of NeoClassical economics. However, there’s more to economic theory than the
axiomatic approach, and in focusing too heavily on this aspect (to draw the boundaries) econophysicists
are ignoring many important details. I think in this case we can agree with Gieryn that these objections
are rhetorical devices employed to create the illusion of importance and originality with the new field
of econophysics.
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approach and in favour of the logical derivation of economics from axioms of (in-
dividual) human action. This view is, however, not at all mainstream (indeed, it is
sometimes labeled ‘heterodox’!). The problem is, there are plenty of economists
who are equally (if not more) uneasy about rational expectations models, utility
maximization, the efficient market hypothesis, and general equilibrium—Austrian
economics is a case in point. There are plenty of examples of empirical economics
too: experimental economics being one obvious example in which NeoClassical
ideas are put to the test and found to be empirically inadequate—see [Guala, 2005].
Moreover, there are plenty of physicists who appear to be unperturbed about work-
ing in a manner detached from experiment: quantum gravity, for example. Here,
the characteristic scales are utterly inaccessible, there is no experimental basis, and
yet the problem occupies the finest minds in physics.
I don’t think we can agree, then, that econophysics adopts a different ‘physics
based’ methodology and this is what distinguishes it from economics. Let us put
this aside, though, and consider why complex systems might be difficult for ax-
iomatic approaches (as the above quote from Challett et al. suggests)? One can
well imagine axioms governing the behaviour of complex systems, with emergent
laws and so on. Surely it is the particular axioms that NeoClassical economic is
based on that are problematic from the perspective of complex systems, not the
axiomatic approach per se? If this is what is meant, then it is a fair point: the
axioms make the wrong predictions about real economic systems. This is hardly
an original point, but it points to a genuine problem with NeoClassical economics
vis-a`-vis complex systems science.
If we are talking not of econophysics per se but the complexity approach in gen-
eral then we do witness a significant difference between this approach and main-
stream economic theory. Moreover, in this case it does turn on a methodological
issue: methodological individualism to be exact. NeoClassical economics is based
on the idea that the way to understand complex socioeconomic phenomena is to
examine the individuals. By synthesizing one’s knowledge of the individual level,
one can deduce the various phenomena. This is purely a mechanical picture, along
the analytical lines of classical mechanics. To understand a complicated entity, de-
compose it into its parts: the whole is nothing but the individual parts that compose
it. In other words, NeoClassical economic theory does not treat economic systems
as complex systems where network, structure, interaction and emergence play a
central explanatory role and individual details are largely irrelevant. In its avoid-
ance of the importance of non-individualistic matters and interactions, however,
NeoClassical theory fails to be empirically adequate. We highlight these flaws in
the next section.
6
ECONOPHYSICS AND THE COMPLEXITY OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 15
STATISTICAL PUZZLES (AKA ‘THE STYLIZED FACTS’)
Financial time series display some prima facie puzzling empirical (statistical) reg-
ularities that make their modeling a tricky business. These are called “stylized
facts”. As Cont [2001] explains, a “stylized fact” is a “set of properties, common
across many instruments, markets and time periods” (p. 223). In other words, styl-
ized facts are universal regularities, independent of time, place, and many specific
compositional details. Coolen [2004] refers to these regularities as “benchmarks,
to be met by any theory claiming to explain aspects of financial time series” (p.
234).
This is a puzzle: why should stocks in, say, pork bellies look the same (statisti-
cally) as stocks in technology companies? The curious statistical properties of the
data are fairly well-known amongst economists, but they remain a puzzle for eco-
nomic theory.18 This is where physicists come in: whereas some economists had
attempted to recover the stylized facts in their models, the models had no empiri-
cal grounding; their sole purpose was to replicate the statistical properties by any
means (admittedly, no small feat in itself given the constraints these stylized facts
impose). Econophysicists, by contrast, use the statistical properties as their start-
ing point; the basis from which to construct realistic models: the universality of the
statistical properties—i.e. the fact that they reappear across many and diverse fi-
nancial markets—suggests (to physicists at least) a common origin at work behind
the scenes and points towards the theory of critical phenomena (with its notion of
universality). Many econophysicists view their task as searching for and elucidat-
ing this common mechanism. This is also where the connection to contemporary
research on complexity comes in: the stylized facts are understood to be emergent
properties of complex economic systems. Here, then, we have a genuinely novel
and potentially important feature of econophysics: the search for mechanisms un-
derlying the economic phenomena utilizing the direct intuitive link between these
phenomena and aspects of statistical physics.19 Let us finally present these stylized
facts on which so much hangs.
18The school known as ‘behavioural economics’ has made some progress along a different (‘inter-
nal’) route to both standard economic theory and econophysics (see [Shefrin, 2002; Shleifer, 2000])—
Herbert Simon [1955] did some excellent early work on behavioural models of rational choice, into
which he tried to inject some realism concerning actual decision making behaviour (vis-a´-vis the actual
computational powers of humans and their limitations in terms of access to information). There are
some overlaps between the behavioural models and the statistical physics models used by econophysi-
cists: in particular, there are analogies between the cooperative or collective phenomena of the physics
of critical phenomena and the imitative models used by behavioural economists. Sornette [2003] offers
a nice integration of behavioural models and statistical physics.
19Again, however, I don’t see how this can be sufficient as it stands. Statistical physics denatures
the economic agents as severely as any NeoClassical theory, and yet surely the nature of the agents
has to play a role in generating the behaviour. True, there might well be emergent effects that enable
us to ignore these details when it comes to modeling, but if it is understanding we seek, then we
cannot ignore the behaviour of the agents. Certainly, if we are to do anything of practical importance
with econophysics then we need some way of translating the statistical physics talk into talk about
real individuals and economic reality. (I am grateful to Allan Walstad for impressing this problem on
me—email communication).
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6.1 The Facts of the Matter
Here I mention only those stylized facts those most relevant to complexity issues20:
Fat Tails: the returns of various assets (evaluated at high frequencies: e.g. a
month and less) exhibit fourth moments (kurtosis levels) that are anoma-
lously high when superimposed over a Gaussian distribution. The distribu-
tions are roughly bell-shaped but assign greater (than normal) probability to
events in the center (i.e. they are more peaked) and at the extremes (i.e. they
exhibit heavy tails). In other words, the time series for returns display a sig-
nificantly larger number of extreme events than a Gaussian process would
generate.
• The standard model of finance involves the idea that price changes
obey a lognormal probability distribution. This implies that massive
fluctuations (crashes or ‘financial earthquakes’) are assigned a van-
ishingly small probability: if the world really were like this, then we
should not be seeing the kinds of crashes we do see.21
Volatility Clustering: periods of intense fluctuations and mild fluctuations tend
to cluster together: big price changes, of either sign, follow big price changes
and little ones, of either sign, follow little ones.
• If the process generating a time series were Gaussian, then we would
expect to see a very uniform time distribution of large and small fluc-
tuations. Instead what we see are sequences of periods of large fluctu-
ations and periods of small fluctuations (high and low volatility).22
Volatility Persistence (‘Long Memory’): there is a dependency between stock
market returns at different times. Technically, the volatility has slowly de-
caying autocorrelations.23
20There are very many more than I present here, but they will suffice to see how econophysics is
supposed to score over the standard model and why the data is believed to point towards a complex
systems approach. See [Cont, 2001] for more examples.
21In statisticians’ terms, if the price changes—or, strictly speaking, their logarithms since we a deal-
ing with a log-normal distribution in the standard model—behaved according to the standard model, the
probability distribution would have a kurtosis of around 0 (0 is the value for data that fit the bell curve
exactly): such distributions are called “mesokurtic”. Distributions of data from real markets, with their
characteristic ‘fat tails,’ exhibit positive kurtosis (giving “leptokurtic” probability distributions).
22Again, in statisticians’ lingo we find the conditional heteroskedasticity of returns. These sudden
switches bring to mind phase transitions, and indeed this analogy is pressed by many econophysicists—
attempts are made to connect this to reality by considering the phenomena to be the result of cooperative
(‘herding’) and competitive effects amongst agents. Again, [Sornette, 2003] is the best place to learn
about this.
23One characterizes the dependence between points of a time series via the Hurst exponent H =
1 − α/2 (where α is the tail exponent for a power law distribution): H = 0.5 indicates a Brownian
motion; 0.5 < H < 1 indicates positive long range correlations (and an underlying long memory
process)—the corresponding data set is known as a fractional Brownian motion. See [Clegg, 2006] for
an elementary guide to the Hurst exponent.
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• The autocorrelation of returns decays very quickly to zero, providing
support for the efficient market hypothesis and for the Brownian mo-
tion model of the standard model of finance.
(8) Linear Returns ≡ C(τ) = Cor(r(t,∆t), r(t+ τ,∆t))
However, the autocorrelation for squared returns decays much more
slowly, and can remain positive for as long as a month. Hence, there
exists nonlinear dependence.
(9) Squared Returns ≡ C2(τ) = Cor(|r(t+ τ,∆t)|2, |r(t,∆t)|2)
Relations: This persistence is obviously related to the above volatility clustering,
and is essentially just what one computes to gain a numerical purchase on
the clustering phenomenon. The clustering itself generates excess volatil-
ity (fat tails). Hence, explaining the clustering and long memory will most
likely constitute an explanation of the fat tails. One would like and expect an
integrated account of the stylized facts, according to which the same mecha-
nism is responsible for generating multiple stylized facts in a unified manner.
This is what econophysicists aim to provide.
In short: price changes change by too much, too often, and with too much ‘order’
to fit the geometric Brownian motion model that the standard model is based on.
There would not be the quantity of large crashes that have been witnessed if that
model were true.24 If we plot the size of price changes against time, we see that
there are far more large changes than the standard model suggests. There is too
much predictability to the time series for it to be a random walk process generat-
ing the data, on account of the clustering and dependence. Mainstream financial
economics does not fit the empirical facts.
The probability distribution is best matched by power-law tails rather than a
Gaussian distribution. The existence of a power-law distribution often points to
some underlying complexity in the system that generates it. It is on this basis that
many tools from the theory of critical phenomena and condensed matter physics
have been brought over. Often, these are used to provide the physical underpin-
nings of various economic phenomena, in addition to providing the mathematical
concepts. It is this feature that makes econophysics so interesting from a philo-
sophical point of view.25
24Recall that many crashes have no apparent cause, which signals that we might have a complex
system. The idea of the EMH, that exogenous factors must be responsible for any price changes (in-
cluding the massive ones in crashes), does not seem to fit the fact that often no such cause (e.g. in the
fundamentals) can be found in ‘postmortems’ of real cases of crashes. Further, changes, contributing
to the volatility, cannot always be due to the impact of some relevant piece of news since the changes
are far more frequent than the arrival of such news—see Bouchaud et al. ([2004], p. 176).
25However, one should be careful in extrapolating too much from the existence of power law be-
haviour. While complexity may be at work ‘behind the scenes’, power laws can spring from rather
more innocuous sources. Take Zipf’s Law for example. This says that the frequency of the nth most
common word in some text is inversely proportional to n. Surely we cannot expect this phenomena
18 D. RICKLES
6.2 Significance of the Stylized Facts
What these features demonstrate is that the underlying mechanism responsible for
generating time series data is not one that produces a normal distribution (nor log-
normal). The latter simply does not fit the observed statistical properties. It follows
that a model based on a normal distribution would assign lower probabilities to ex-
treme events than it ought to to be empirically successful. Given that the standard
model of finance involves returns that are log-normally distributed, there is a clear
conflict here between theory and evidence. There is every reason to attempt al-
ternative approaches: econophysics is one such, but there are others that do well.
It is notable that the other approaches that tend to do well with the stylized facts
are complex systems oriented—agent-based computational economics, for exam-
ple (see [Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006] for a good overview). The idea is to view the
stylized facts as emergent properties of a complex system.
There are diverse attempts to reproduce these stylized facts with various meth-
ods and models: broadly one can replicate (instrumentalism) or one can explain
(realism). Econophysics uses models based on statistical physics and is an attempt
along the latter lines. However, this is not the only option: as mentioned, econo-
physics does not have a monopoly on the stylized facts. For starters, these stylized
facts were isolated well before the emergence of econophysics. In fact they go
back at least as far as Wesley Mitchell [1913], who identified such properties in
the context of his work on business cycles. Large fluctuations in the economy were
found to occur roughly every ten years. These fluctuations were thought to be due
to external factors. Stanley Jevons [Jevons, 1884] too drew attention to similar
regularities in his work on commercial fluctuations. Jevons famously argued (on
the basis of a statistical correlation) that the fluctuations were the result of similar
fluctuations in the weather (the cycles of sunspots).
Microsimulation models (such as the ‘agent-based’ models mentioned above)
seem to fall somewhere between instrumentalism and realism. For example, the
model of Lux (an economist) and Marchesi (an engineer) [1999] involves hetero-
geneous trading strategies: there are ‘noise traders’ or ‘chartists’ on the one hand
(whose decisions are based on the price histories) and ‘fundamentalists’ on the
other (whose decisions are based on the notion that there is a fundamentally correct
price, namely the discounted sum of future earnings). Switches between strategies
are also possible. From this setup they are able to recover statistical aspects of real
markets. (For a methodologically similar approach see [Bak et al., 1997].) Hence,
micro-simulations constitute an attempt to provide an explanation of what were
“hitherto mysterious statistical findings like the fat tails and clustered volatility of
financial markets” (Lux and Heitger [2001] p. 123). Are these econophysics mod-
and the stylized facts of financial markets to have a common origin—though Zipf [1949] came close to
saying something like this! See Newman [2005] for a very clear-headed review of power laws and their
interpretation, including the various mechanisms by which they can be generated. In practice it is also
often difficult to distinguish power-laws from other distributions: see [Laherre`re and Sornette, 1998;
Pisarenko and Sornette, 2006].
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els? It seems not, though they are clearly inspired by statistical mechanics. Given
the availability of other effective models we ought, then, to view econophysics as
one of several ways of making sense of the complexity of financial systems. That
is not to say that these ways are disparate: microsimulations are obviously used in
statistical physics and the conceptual connections are readily apparent—i.e. both
involve the idea of generating macrophenomena from microbehaviour.
The stylized facts hold further significance on a more conceptual level: the
stylized facts encode non-trivial social regularities. It is the universality of these
regularities is what most interests econophysicists—after all, physicists are in the
business of laws and invariances. The stylized facts appear to be invariances that
reappear over apparently unrelated systems suggesting that some common under-
lying mechanism is responsible. The case for comparison here is with the theory of
critical phenomena and phase transitions. During a phase transition a system will
shift from a relatively disordered global state to a more ordered global state. Or, in
other words, parts go from not imitating one another to imitating one another, so
that everything depends on everything else (infinite correlation length): a shift in
one part propagates (thanks to massive connectivity) to every other part. In such
‘critical’ conditions the system is said to be ‘scale free’ so that events of any size
can occur, corresponding, of course, to the fat tails which can exhibit themselves
as (not infrequent) stock market bubbles and crashes.26 We turn to the statistical
physics explanation in the next section. We consider the issue of the lawhood of
the stylized facts in the subsequent section.
7
STYLIZED FACTS ACCORDING TO ECONOPHYSICS
As anyone who reads the finance pages27 knows, prices of assets fluctuate, some-
times wildly. According to the econophysicist’s conception of financial markets
the prices (of assets) are viewed as fluctuating macroscopic variables that are de-
termined by the interactions of vast numbers of agents. They are but one of the
observables of a complex financial system. Financial time series demonstrate that
extreme events are relatively common. A normal distribution would, as we have
seen, appear to be inadequate: one needs a distribution with more probability mass
in the tails. Power laws appear to fit the bill very well: they possess a scaling prop-
erty according to which events of all sizes can occur. So far there is nothing to
distinguish this analysis as especially econophysical. However, in contrast to the
standard model, which views the stylized facts as the result of exogenous factors,
the econophysics approach views them as emergent properties resulting from the
internal dynamics (the interactions that occur between individual traders). In a
26The phase transition suggestion has been taken further with specific applications of spin-system
models. The idea here is that stock prices respond to demand in the same way that the magnetization
of an interacting spin-system responds to changes in the magnetic field (see [Plerou et al., 2002]).
27Or has a computer program that displays the time series as I do!
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nutshell: the traders’ local interactions (the market’s microstructure) determines a
global pattern (the market’s macrophenomena), which feeds back to the traders’
future behaviour. This perspective is developed from parts of statistical physics28,
where one deals with many interdependent parts that ‘imitate’ each others’ be-
haviour (collective phenomena). In such cases, systems of prima facie extremely
diverse nature and constitution are found to behave in the same way (the feature
physicists call universality). According to econophysics, financial markets are part
of this class of systems too.
Thus, the ground is set to apply a host of techniques from statistical physics:
simply view financial markets as complex systems whose ‘particles’ are the traders
and apply the techniques as usual. As a further step one then constructs ‘microsim-
ulations’ (or ‘agent based models’) to test the models and to study the mechanism
whereby the macrophenomena emerge from the microstructure ([Levy et al., 2000]
offers a comprehensive treatment). These simulations attempt to generate prop-
erties of financial markets, such as the stylized facts, from the interactions and
properties of traders, thus mimicking statistical physics’ models in which parti-
cles’ behaviour generates properties of a unit complex system—see, again, Lux
and Marchesi [1999] for a good example and [Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006] for a
more comprehensive treatment.
7.1 The Statistical Physics Analogy
Very often in systems with interacting parts, and whose interacting parts gener-
ate properties of the unit system, one finds that the thus generated properties obey
scaling laws. Scaling laws tell us about statistical relationships in a system that
are invariant with respect to transformations of scale (once certain transformations
have been carried out on various parameter values). In statistical physics these
scaling laws are viewed as emergent properties generated by the interactions of the
microscopic subunits. Scaling laws are explained, then, via collective behaviour
amongst a large number of mutually interacting components. The components
in this financial case would simply be the market’s ‘agents’ (traders, speculators,
hedgers, etc...). These laws are ‘universal laws’, independent of microscopic de-
tails, and dependent on just a few macroscopic parameters (e.g. symmetries and
spatial dimensions). Econophysicists surmise that since economic systems consist
of large numbers of interacting parts too, perhaps scaling theory can be applied
to financial markets; perhaps the stylized facts can be represented by the universal
laws arising in scaling theory. This analogy is the motivation behind a considerable
chunk of work in econophysics; it is through this analogy, then, that the stylized
facts receive their explanation—though, as I have said, presumably not their ul-
28There have been attempts to apply statistical mechanics to economics as far back as 1959 when
M. F. M. Osborne developed his Brownian motion model of a stock market [Osbourne, 1959]. Duncan
Foley has done extensive work in this area [Foley, 1994]. Farjoun and Machover also develop this
analogy [Machover and Farjoun, 1983]. In each case, however, the model is equilibrium statistical
mechanics, and it is precisely the equilibrium condition that is thought to be at fault by econophysics.
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timate explanation which will involve such things as the agents’ psychology, the
institutions in which the agents operate, and so on (cf. [Lux, 2001] p. 562).29
The power-law behaviour of financial instruments can be explained in terms
of the scaling laws that arise in the theory of critical phenomena: complex phe-
nomena involving the collective behaviour of a family of subunits produce such
power-laws. Power-laws have a particularly simple form, as we have already seen
(but we repeat in a modified form for simplicity). For an event (e.g. an earthquake,
stock market crash or price fluctuation, etc...) of magnitude (energy, size, etc...)
‖x‖ (or greater) the probability Prob(x) that x will occur is given by:
(10) Prob(x) ∼ ‖x‖−α
Here, the exponent −α—now called the critical exponent in the context of the
theory of critical phenomena—is set by the empirically observed behaviour of the
system in question. Systems with identical critical exponents belong to the same
‘universality class’ and will exhibit similar statistical properties (near their critical
points). Such systems are interesting because they do not have an ‘average’ x or
a ‘width’ σ. What this means is that there is a greater chance for complex sys-
tems having massive events than there is for systems that fit a normal distribution.
Hence, financial markets are complex systems because they exhibit such massive
events more often than normally distributed systems in a manner consistent with
power law behaviour (often viewed as a ‘signature’ of complexity).
7.2 Scaling, Universality and Criticality
Most of the research conducted in econophyics is based on an analogy between
financial markets and scaling theory and theory critical phenomena. We present
the argument explicitly in §7.3, first we spell out some of the details.
Given some observable O and driving parameter x, a scale-invariant function
can be defined by the functional equation (where x→ λx is an arbitrary rescaling):
(11) O(x) = µO(λx)
The solution of this equation is the functional relation (a power law, in fact):
(12) O(x) = xα
29Note that there have been ‘ultimate’ explanations for these facts that do not involve the sociobiolog-
ical of the economic agents. The general approach to power-law distributions and complex behaviour
in nature (including the biological and social realm) given in the theory of ‘self-organized criticality’
[Bak, 1996] is supposed to accomplish such a general explanation. The idea is that complex systems
spontaneously tune themselves (their parameters) to the critical values required for power law (scale-
free) behaviour to emerge. However, this approach is controversial: it is a moot point, to say the least,
whether the mechanism could be the same across social, biological, and more fundamental systems.
See [Frigg, 2003] for a critical discussion.
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That is, equations of this functional form are scale-invariant. They are of interest in
statistical physics (and econophysics) because many-body systems that are close to
critical (or bifurcation) points obey such power laws. Renormalization group the-
ory analysis shows that there are universal properties in such systems (systems in
the same universality class), meaning that diverse systems share the same critical
exponents (and scaling behaviour) and so display qualitatively identical macro-
scopic properties (when approaching criticality). Of course, stock markets are not
going to always be poised at a critical point, so one expects to see different regimes
separated by phase transitions. Kiyno et al. [2006] show that such behaviour can
be found in S&P500 market data. When financial markets occupy a regime near
to a critical point the behaviour corresponds to the volatility clustering, akin to
the spins in a magnet aligning versus pointing in the same direction—otherwise
there is disordered behaviour well approximated by (geometric) Brownian mo-
tion. The large fluctuations correspond to the scale invariance of systems near to
critical points. One sees in this way how a unified account of the three stylized
facts emerges from a statistical physics based account.
7.3 Unpacking the Econophysics Argument
It is an uncontested fact that financial market time series display statistical regu-
larities (whether they constitute laws or not is contested). These regularities have
similar characteristics to those obeyed by other complex systems in the physics
of critical phenomena. In particular, one can interpret the stylized facts as scaling
laws. I think we can discern at the root of a great deal of econophysics research
the following argument from analogy:
(P1) Financial markets are made up of a large number of interacting agents
(P2) According to statistical physics, physical (natural) systems that are composed of large numbers of
interacting individuals follow scaling laws that are universal
(P3) Financial markets do exhibit universal regularities that show up as stylized facts in their time series
————————————————————————————————————————
(C) The stylized facts are scaling laws of the kind found in statistical physics
In other words, given that financial markets have a physical composition like that
of systems dealt with in statistical physics (large numbers of interacting individ-
uals) and given, furthermore, that the time series exhibit statistical regularities
similar to that of systems dealt with in statistical physics, it follows that a good
modeling strategy is to apply statistical physics to financial markets. This argu-
ment is presented as a ‘plausibility argument’:
Simply put, statistical physicists have determined that physical systems which consist of a large num-
ber of interacting particles obey universal laws that are independent of the microscopic details. This
progress was mainly due to the development of scaling theory. Since economic systems also consist
of a large number of interacting units, it is plausible that scaling theory can be applied to economics.
([Stanley et al., 1996c], p. 415)
A further step is to take statistical physics as providing ‘physically realistic’ mod-
els capable of explaining financial phenomena—something Stanley and his group
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seem to endorse. But clearly the argument is not deductively valid; nor is it in-
tended to be. It is intended to increase our confidence in the application of statisti-
cal physics to financial markets and our confidence in the complexity of financial
markets. Given that scaling theory and the theory critical phenomena are asso-
ciated with complex systems, it would further follow that financial markets are
complex systems, in the sense that they undergo phase transitions and, at least
some of the time, exist near criticality (between order and chaos, if you like that
way of speaking). Since this behaviour is seen too, then the position is further
bolstered.
8
STYLIZED FACTS AS LAWS OF NATURE
Johnson et al. [2003] claim that “[o]ne of the significant contributions of Econo-
physics has been to establish that the price statistics across a wide range of suppos-
edly different financial markets worldwide, exhibit certain universal properties” (p.
57). The existence of these stylized facts is then taken to point to a shared structure
or process generating the statistics in each case (chance, self-organized criticality,
etc.). As I mentioned, this is an overstatement: econophysicists have indeed so-
lidified these results, but many were known prior to the advent of econophysics.
What distinguishes econophysics from other approaches in economics is the inter-
pretation of the stylized facts. In addition to viewing them as emergent properties
of a complex system, it also includes a greater commitment to the stylized facts,
treating them as laws rather ‘mere’ regularities. Part and parcel of this view of
the stylized facts as genuine laws is, as Coolen [2004] puts it, that “[i]t is irrele-
vant...whether the microscopic variables at hand represent coordinates of colliding
particles, microscopic magnets, replicating polymers, or (as in the present case)
the actions of decision-making agents” (pp. 1-2). That is, the laws themselves
are emergent in the sense that they don’t depend on the microscopic details of the
system.
However, this stance is at odds with (econophysicist) Joseph McCauley [2004],
who views the addition of decision-making agents (with free will) as very relevant
indeed, even in econophysics: such agents are incompatible with the possibil-
ity of invariances, and without invariances there are no symmetries, and without
symmetries there are no laws. McCauley argues, therefore, that, like economics,
econophysics can at best be a descriptive historical science (see also [Rosenberg,
1992]) analyzing what happened in some economic situation. Other econophysi-
cists (most, in fact) believe that they can find some laws for market dynamics,
albeit statistical ones of course; but, says McCauley, “[t]here are no known so-
cioeconomic invariances to support that hope” ([2004] p. 4). Whereas laws of
nature are independent of initial conditions, socioeconomic behaviour is not: “so-
cioeconomic behaviour is not necessarily universal but may vary from country to
country” (ibid.).
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It is of course perfectly true that there will be many differences in socioeco-
nomic behaviour between countries, but that does not mean that there are no invari-
ants. As empirical work by econophysicists and econometrists (and sociologists)
has revealed, there are some surprising commonalities. It is these very common-
alities that kick-started econophysics (at least, most of it). There do seem to be
examples of statistical laws that do not vary from country to country: Pareto’s
Law, for example. Pareto investigated the statistical properties concerning the dis-
tribution of wealth over the individuals in a population. The model involved is the
scale-invariant (cumulative) probability distribution function p(w ≥ x) ∼ x−α.
This says that the number of people with income w greater than or equal to x is
given by x raised to some power −α (which, for a variety of data sets, Pareto
found to be around 1.5). Pareto found that the relationship applies to very different
nations, of different sizes and composition: “as different as those of England, of
Ireland, of germany, and even of Peru” ([Pareto, 1897], §958; quoted in [Stanley,
2003]). In other words, it is universal: multiple distinct nations satisfy the same
power-law—i.e. the universality class of Pareto’s law includes England, Ireland,
Germany, and Peru. Closer, and more recent scrutiny finds universal power-law
behaviour too, but only in the tails, for the most extreme (i.e. the richest) 5% or
so of the distribution: the first 95% or so is characterized by a more traditional
‘log-normal’ or exponential curve—see the papers in [Chatterjee et al., 2005] for
more details.30
But there is something right about McCauley’s objection; and he is well aware
of the example just given of course. His point is that “markets merely reflect what
we are doing economically, and the apparent rules of behaviour of markets, what-
ever they may appear to be temporarily, can change rapidly with time” (ibid., p.
200 - emphasis in original). This non-stationarity is, of course, a general feature
of adaptive complex systems: “the empirical distribution is not fixed once and for
all by any law of nature [but] is also subject to change with agents’ collective be-
haviour” (ibid., p. 185). Prima facie the problem appears to be more serious in
human systems: as Zhou and Sornette put it, “human beings are not spins, they
can learn, that is, adapt the nature and strength of their interactions with others,
based on past experience” ([2006] p. 1).31
It is, of course, perfectly true that the macroscopic (emergent) distribution would
be altered if agents altered their (microscopic) patterns enough. However, the issue
here is whether there is a lawlike relation between certain patterns of (microlevel)
behaviour and the distribution: do we find the same distributions appearing in
cases where the patterns are a certain way, and in particular when we have systems
30It is rather interesting to note that Schumpeter, writing of Pareto and his work on ‘social invariants’,
suggested the approach (or one like it) that econophysics now seems to be pursuing: “nobody seems
to have realized that the hunt for, and the interpretation of, invariants of this type [Pareto’s Law—DR]
might lay the foundations for an entirely novel type of theory” ([1951] p. 121).
31An interesting connection can perhaps be made here with MacKenzie’s study of financial markets
and their relationship to financial models [2006]: as theories and models about the workings of mar-
kets change, the way trading is done changes in response and so, as a consequence, do the financial
observables and their distributions. (See also [Johnson et al., 2003] p. 223-4 for a similar point.)
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behaving according to the characteristics of complex systems given in §2? Here
the econophysicists who believe they are discovering laws would appear to have
some evidence in the form of the scaling laws that Pareto first investigated (but
that have been found in a much wider variety of economic observables). In truth,
the evidence is not conclusive.
An alternative response to McCauley might be to point to the fact that it is the
norms and institutions that circumscribe economic behaviour (and these too can
arise a` la complex systems theory). Since there are common norms and institutions
in many and varied countries we should expect to find the statistical regularities we
do find. These norms and institutions could be altered, resulting in the regularities
vanishing but while there is some common socioeconomic system in place there
will be common emergent properties (these are the stylized facts).32
9
ARE FINANCIAL MARKETS REALLY COMPLEX?
Do financial markets possess the characteristics of complex systems? Econophysi-
cists (and, indeed, many economists) certainly view financial markets as particu-
larly fine examples of complex systems, as cases of ‘complexity in action.’ For
example, Lisa Borland [2005] writes that “[p]erhaps one of the most vivid and
richest examples of the dynamics of a complex system at work is the behaviour
of financial markets” (p. 228). Stanley et al. [2001] write that “[t]he economy is
perhaps one of the most complex of all complex systems” (p. 3). Johnson et al.
[2003] claim that “it would be hard to find anyone who disagreed with the state-
ment that a financial market is indeed a ‘complex’ system” (p. 2)—however, there
are dissenting voices, or at least those who think that the evidence isn’t as good as
the previous quotations suggest.
Durlauf [2005] argues that the evidence from the econophysicists research and
empirical work is not conclusive evidence in favour of economic complexity since
the evidence is underdetermined by alternative approaches. Recent work by Pis-
arenko and Sornette [2006] also pours water on the flames for similar reasons:
they show that the power law model at best provides an approximation of the be-
haviour of market returns. The real story is much more complex. The lesson they
32Of course, this ultimately concedes the point to McCauley. It seems that at best only weakened
account of laws can be sustained: Laws relative to the socioeconomic system that is in place. This can
perhaps be rendered universal in the physicist’s sense since we are at liberty to say that whenever the
system is set up in this way (with large numbers of parts interacting so as to generate a complex system)
it will exhibit these properties (i.e. the stylized facts). Indeed, this doesn’t seem to be at odds with laws
in physics since even the most fundamental are hedged in some way: Einstein’s law describing the
relationship between gravity and mass-energy, for example, is not scale-invariant; it gets modified at
the Planck scale (of the order 10−33cm. Likewise, the field equations of the standard model of particle
physics can only be to be taken to apply in a universe without gravity. What I am suggesting here is
similar: in a socioeconomic system where there is free-trade and the trading is done in such and such a
way, then we get the following distributions of events for the observables. (My thanks to Cliff Hooker
for reminding me that physics’ laws are hedged too.)
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draw is that we shouldn’t assume that power law behaviour will extend into the
unobserved regions of the distribution’s tail. In particular, there are plenty more
fat-tailed distributions33 that offer as good an approximation to many data sets in
finance (and social science in general).
Likewise, Brock [1999] is concerned with the kinds of process that are capable
of generating the data that enter financial time series. He points to an underdeter-
mination of stochastic processes by scaling laws.34 In other words, one and the
same scaling law is compatible with multiple distributions. This is an identifica-
tion problem: “uncovering and estimating the underlying causal data generating
mechanism” ([Brock, 1999], p. 411). The mere isolation of scaling laws in the
data is not sufficient to enable the making of inferences about the nature of the
data generation process.
He argues that scaling laws are useful in a limited way: they function as con-
straints on the underlying causal data generating process. They do not serve as a
decisive guide to the kind of process responsible for the data. Likewise, the scaling
laws can restrict the class of distributions—Gaussian distributions are rendered im-
potent, for example. So the scaling laws can falsify but not confirm.35 The scaling
law research is, as Durlauf puts it, “consistent with complex systems models” but
“[the] evidence is far from decisive and is amenable to alternative interpretations”
([Durlauf, 2005], p. F226). Hence, both Brock and Durlauf are not convinced that
econophysics has demonstrated economic complexity.
However, this does not negate the claim that financial markets are complex
systems—it just means that the claim that they are should be treated with more
care and attention than it has received so far within the econophysics community.
It has to be said that for most econophysics researchers the complexity of eco-
nomic systems is an assumption taken for granted rather than something they seek
to prove. It simply seems obvious to them that economic systems are complex
systems. However, I think that Brock and Durlauf put too much weight on under-
determination: I think we can defend the complexity view from these objections.
The scaling laws are but one of the stylized facts to be met by an approach.
One has to explain the clustering and long-range dependence too (indeed, it seems
evident that these will be responsible for the heavy tails). There are a great many
33They give the example of the ‘stretched exponential’ family of distributions defined by:
PSE(x)≥u = 1 − exp [−(x/d)c + (u/d)c] (where x ≥ u). One can ‘fatten’ the tails of the
distribution by playing with the various constants in this expression.
34Hence, we have two levels of underdetermination here: (1) concerning whether the correct distri-
bution really is a power law. (2) concerning the mechanism that generated the distribution (assuming it
really is a power law).
35Philosophers of science are well acquainted with this kind of problem. It is simply the curve-fitting
problem (itself a variant of the problem of induction) in a different guise. We can argue that, for a given
data set, any general theory can only ever be consistent with it (rather than proven from it). However,
just because multiple theories are equally well-cnfirmed by the data does not imply that they are equal
simpliciter. For example, one theory may have better unifying power (it might cover a larger range
of phenomena): econophysics seems to have this virtue; it can accommodate multiple stylized facts
using the same concepts. Other possible distinguishing marks are simplicity, elegance, cohesion with
background knowledge, and so on.
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more statistical facts that have to be accommodated by an approach. In principal I
think we agree with Brock that the stylized facts function as constraints, but, taken
together, this constrains the possible stochastic processes a great deal. It is very
difficult to get any models that reproduce all of the features. As mentioned in fn.
35, the statistical physics (econophysics) approach involving scaling laws does an
exceptional job at covering a great many stylized facts in a unified way. We can
understand this as an ‘inference to the best explanation’ kind of argument: this
seems consistent with the way econophysics talk about complexity.
Still, it seems that the ability to definitely demonstrate the existence of a unique
mechanism responsible for the fit to the statistical model involving a power law
distribution evades us. Brock and Durlauf are quite right to insist on the application
of better statistical testing to see what kind of distribution is implied by a data set.36
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CONCLUSION
Intuitively, financial markets appear to be complex and they pass many tests for
what we expect a complex system to be like. There is still some doubt as to whether
they are truly complex: when it comes to more rigorous statistical tests of com-
plexity the jury is still out. Be that as it may, the profusion of data collected about
financial markets makes them an ideal specimen from the point of view of com-
plexity research: nowhere else do we possess as much data recorded so accurately
and at so many time scales. Econophysics has proven itself to be an excellent
way of probing this conjectured complexity. Moreover, the (controversial) revo-
lutionary claims made by econophysicists, vis-a`-vis traditional economic theory
and social laws, make this subject eminently fit for philosophical consumption. It
ought, therefore, to play a central role in future discussions of the philosophy of
complex systems science.
RESOURCES AND FURTHER READING
Articles on econophysics appear in a variety of journals. The primary ones are:
Physica A37, Quantitative Finance, Physical Review E, and Europhysics Letters.
One can also find pertinent articles in The European Physical Journal B, Fractals,
36Aaron Clauset, Cosma Shalizi, and M. E. J. Newman have developed some impressive (open
source) R and Matlab code that is capable of discriminating between a large number of closely related
relevant distributions, and this should put an end to the debate on first level of underdetermination
(namely, whether a data set does indeed obey a power law distribution). This is available at http:
//www.santafe.edu/~aaronc/powerlaws/. A paper [Clauset et al., 2007] corresponding to the
code, dealing with the identification of power laws, can also be found on this web page.
37Volume 324, Issue 1-2, 2003, contains the proceedings of the international econophysics confer-
ence held in Bali in August 2002.
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Advances in Complex Systems, International Journal of Theoretical and Applied
Finance, Physical Review Letters, and Nature.
Internet Resources:
• The Econophysics Forum: http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/.
• Econophysics.org: http://www.ge.infm.it/~ecph/library/index.php.
• The Econophysics Blog: http://econophysics.blogspot.com/.
• The Electronic Journal of Evolutionary Modeling and Economic Dynamics:
http://beagle.u-bordeaux4.fr/jemed/.
• The economist/philosopher J. Barkley Rosser has some excellent articles
available on his website: http://cob.jmu.edu/rosserjb/.
• A great many articles from Stanley’s group can be found at the website for
the Center for Polymer Studies at Boston University: http://polymer.
bu.edu/~hes/econophysics/.
• A fairly comprehensive bibliography of relevant material can be found at:
http://www.ge.infm.it/~ecph/bibliography/bibliography.html.
A more general website, which occasionally features econophysics-related news,
is The Complexity Digest: http://www.comdig.com/.
Textbooks:
There are now many econophysics textbooks on the market. I mention just six of
the best here:
• The first textbook on econophysics is Rosario Mantegna and Eugene Stan-
ley’s Introduction to Econophysics: Correlations and Complexity in Finance
(Cambridge University Press, 1999). This is still an excellent way to gain a
feel for the nature of econophysics.
• An in-depth guide, primarily focused on risk management, is Bouchard and
Potters’ Theory of Financial Risk and Derivative Pricing (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2003).
• An excellent general guide to the entire field is Voit’s The Statistical Me-
chanics of Financial Markets (Springer, 2005).
• A more controversial text covering plenty of philosophical issues is Mc-
Cauley’s Dynamics of Markets (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
• In terms of the ‘complexity connection’ the best books are Financial Market
Complexity by Johnson et al. (Oxford University Press, 2003) and Minority
Games by Challett et al. (Oxford University Press, 2004).
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Review Articles:
A philosophically oriented review of econophysics is given in [Rickles, 2007].
More general reviews are: [Gligor and Ignat, 2001] and [Feigenbaum, 2003].
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